SOVIET
POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1922-1941
Marjory Winn
Georgetown University, Washington, DC
Between
1922 and 1941, Soviet policy toward Germany alternated between
cooperation and hostility. At first glance, the evidence suggests
that the Soviets were indecisive about their relations with
the Germans. However, this paper argues that a deliberate political
calculus guided Soviet decision-making, namely the desire to
avoid entanglement in another major war. The key to achieving
this aim, in their estimation, was the restoration of a European
balance of power* [*Balance of power is defined as the attempt
to secure peace by creating alliances with the capacity to offset
each other in the event of an attack]. Thus, the Soviets maintained
an alliance with Germany inasmuch as it served their overriding
policy objectives. When Hitler's rise to power raised the specter
of German revanchism, the Soviets correspondingly moved toward
a new collective security**[For the purposes of this work, collective
security refers to the formation of inter-state alliances in
order to deter outsider attacks.] arrangement with the Entente
powers. As collective security began to break down and signs
of an impending European war intensified, the Soviets tried
to resurrect the German alliance. In the end, however, the Soviet
policy lens obscured their ability to discern the real danger
Hitler posed and led them into the exact situation they had
so diligently tried to avoid: an isolated war against Nazi Germany.
By
1922, the avoidance of war had already gained a preeminent place
in Soviet foreign policy decision-making. Lenin vividly recalled
how during the civil war the Western powers actively sought
to destroy the nascent Soviet regime, dispensing troops and
material assistance to support the White movement. Consequently,
the threat of capitalist encirclement took on a greater urgency
for Lenin and his cadre after the war. Fear of isolation made
security concerns paramount in the Soviet foreign policy calculus.
At the same time, security was given newfound emphasis in order
to afford the Soviet regime room to focus on domestic concerns.
Burdened with the enormous task of consolidating power and rebuilding
the nation's economic and military base, the Soviet regime needed
to shore up its resources. The realization that further entanglement
in foreign conflicts would jeopardize the regime's survival
spearheaded a new politics of accommodation. In conjunction
with this new policy shift, ideological principles had to be
reformulated. According to R. Craig Nation, the call for worldwide
revolution was shelved "in order to prepare for what Lenin
called 'peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world"'
(38). In sum, this new accomodationist approach was an attempt
to achieve a higher degree of security so that the country could
augment its economic and military strength.
Looking
at the post-WWI order, Lenin feared the emergence of an anti-Soviet
coalition among the European powers, a fear that intensified
after the USSR was excluded from the League of Nations. Germany
presented the means to restore a balance of power within Europe,
and the two countries' mutual exclusion from the Versailles
system served as a unifying basis for cooperation. In April
of 1922, the Soviet quest for security generated a significant
payoff in the form of the Rapallo treaty. In addition to opening
up political ties, the Rapallo agreement included a secret clause
providing for German military and technical assistance in exchange
for training in Russia. This component furthered the post-war
recovery of each, namely Soviet industrialization and German
military development. In this way, the Rapallo link served both
the international and domestic interests of the Soviet regime.
Rapallo
remained virtually untarnished until Hitler's rise to power
in 1933. Despite the Nazi's anti-communist rhetoric and revanchist
policies, Soviet retaliation was minimal. In fact, according
to Vojtech Mastny, Stalin initially welcomed fascism, believing
that it signaled capitalism's impending end. After several arrests
of Soviet citizens in Germany and violent attacks on Soviet
business premises, however, the Soviets became increasingly
unnerved. Nevertheless, they continued their efforts to preserve
the Rapallo line, publishing a call for revision of the Versailles
system in Pravda in May 1933. According to Jonathan Haslam,
this letter signaled "all hope had not been lost of reviving
Rapallo, but that the initiative was now up to the Germans"
(15). Despite such attempts, German-Soviet cooperation suffered
further deterioration.
Increasingly,
the Soviets considered Nazi Germany a threat to peace in Europe
and the continuation of Stalin's industrialization campaign.
Hitler's decision to sign the Four Powers Pact with Italy, France,
and Great Britain in July of 1933 was an incontrovertible sign
of Rapallo's demise. Germany's uncertain allegiance unraveled
the status quo balance of power and confronted the Soviets with
the prospect of isolation. In response, the Soviets sought new
strategies to salvage the balance of power. The goal of preventing
war if at all possible remained the preeminent Soviet foreign
policy concern.
The
new imperative to offset German revanchism paved the way for
Litvinov's collective security proposal. By 1934, new efforts
were underway to tie the USSR and the Entente powers in opposition
to Nazi Germany. Although Litvinov's effort to bolster cooperation
with the Entente was a logical reaction to heightened German
aggression, the road to collective security was filled with
obstacles. The persistent Soviet distrust toward the bourgeois,
Western democracies weakened cooperation efforts and made it
all the more difficult to move away from the pro-German orientation
established by Lenin. For instance, French pressure to join
the League of Nations initially sparked intense Soviet resistance,
prompting some Soviet leaders to advocate a return to Rapallo.
However, new appeasement attempts were abandoned when Hitler
tried to overthrow the Austrian government on July 25, 1934.
Nevertheless this gesture showed that even as Soviet leaders
lauded coalition building as the principal foundation for security,
they were clearly not against using the European powers against
one another in order to further Soviet aims.
The
freedom to maneuver was an essential tool in Soviet foreign
policy making and indeed, Moscow's double-dealings did not go
unmatched. During the summer of 1935, the British stepped up
their efforts to redirect Hitler eastward, urging France to
support them. By July, the French foreign minister was pursuing
an understanding with Berlin and seeking to delay ratification
of the Franco-Soviet pact. As the French became more closely
tied to Britain, the Soviets felt betrayed. According to Haslam,
they were left "with an alliance which was essentially
inoperable without British goodwill, and since the British did
not trust the Russians, Soviet isolationists did not have to
look far to find support for their views" (101). In response,
Soviet officials in Berlin communicated their willingness to
reduce interstate tensions, although hopes were soon dashed
by Hitler's increasingly anti-Soviet line. These retaliation
measures did little to shift the Entente powers' foreign policy
in a more pro-Soviet direction. In fact, they intensified the
feelings of mistrust and made cooperation less and less tenable.
By
1938, Litvinov's collective security system faced a critical
test. German invasion of Czechoslovakia appeared imminent. Under
the terms of the 1935 mutual assistance pact, the USSR was compelled
to defend Czechoslovakia as long as the Czech people and France
both rose up in defense. As the Soviets awaited a corridor of
access to provide military protection to the Czechs, France
and Britain arranged an exclusive meeting in Munich. Here they
agreed to the German annexation of the Czech Sudetenland. From
the Soviet perspective, this outcome signaled the utter failure
of collective security.
France
and Britain's decision to make conciliatory gestures toward
Germany assumed that the Soviet Union was firmly locked in the
Entente camp. Given Hitler's anti-communist rhetoric, they saw
little potential for a Soviet-German alliance. They failed to
realize, however, that the Soviets never completely abandoned
the Rapallo option. The true gravity of this misjudgment became
clear in the wake of the Czechoslovakian crisis. Beginning in
December 1938, the USSR concluded a new trade agreement with
Germany, an indication of growing rapprochement. Although negotiations
with Britain and France continued throughout the summer of 1939,
intensified Soviet demands were countered with deliberate delay
on the part of the Entente, heightening tensions between the
two sides. In May, Litvinov was replaced as commissar of foreign
affairs by Molotov, a move that effectively spelled the end
of collective security.
With
Hitler showing himself more open to expanding relations with
the USSR, the lion's share of Soviet diplomacy focused on resurrecting
Rapallo. Initially, attempts to forge Soviet-German rapprochement
were hindered by the Baltic question. Indeed, the German seizure
of Memel from Lithuania alarmed Stalin because of its close
proximity to Leningrad. However, by 1939, Hitler showed signs
that he intended to strike Poland next rather than the Baltics.
Given their historical animosity toward Poland, the Soviets
were much more amenable to this policy. Thus, with the Baltic
issue off the table, the Soviet Union could more easily afford
to pursue a modus vivendi with the Germans.
Stalin
identified rapprochement with Germany as the most effective
way to avoid war. By August 1939, the two countries signed a
nonaggression treaty with a secret protocol for the division
of Eastern Europe. One month later, they finalized the zones
of influence and broadened the nonaggression treaty into an
alliance. Whether or not Stalin believed that the agreement
would actually last remains open to debate. At face value, it
offered the Soviets a chance to avoid military entanglement
while simultaneously heightening tensions between Germany and
its western neighbors and was, thus, consistent with Stalin's
overriding foreign policy objectives. Indeed, the alliance proved
partially successful inasmuch as it delayed Soviet entrance
into the war by one and a half years. To a country still recovering
from the effects of Stalin's purges, that window of time was
believed to be vital.
The
German-Soviet alliance was not without its risks for the Soviet
Union. As Nation noted, economic provisions in the pact augmented
German power, an outcome that clearly ran counter to Soviet
interests. In November 1939, the USSR was cut off from the League
of Nations. Under these conditions, the USSR would be left to
its own defenses in the event of a German invasion. This scenario
was extremely alarming to Stalin because he knew just how weakened
the Soviet military was as a result of the purges. Thus, the
desperate need to avoid war was sufficiently compelling to push
the Soviet Union toward the dangerous commitment with Germany.
Reservations
about German intentions increased following Hitler's surprisingly
quick defeat of France. Only Britain and the USSR remained as
obstacles to continental German domination. Stalin reacted with
a heightened campaign to rebuild the military high command,
but this enormous task required time. Cognizant of his limited
maneuvering room, Stalin stepped up efforts to appease the Germans.
Whether it meant turning a blind eye to Germany's annexation
of Bulgaria or increasing military exports, Stalin held out
hope that Germany would honor the nonaggression treaty. In Hitler's
estimation, however, the pact had outlived its usefulness. Thus,
while the Soviets clung desperately to the appeasement line,
Hitler was formulating plans for Operation Barbarossa. With
the launch of Hitler's blitzkrieg attack in June 1941, the Soviet
Union was drawn into full-scale war.
In
conclusion, the USSR's policies during the interwar period reflected
an overwhelming desire to avoid war and relations with Germany
were measured accordingly. In 1922, the Soviets pursued an alliance
with the Germans as a means to restore a balance of power in
Europe and to prevent the formation of a united anti-Soviet
front. Indeed, the Rapallo line served Soviet security interests
well until Hitler's rise to power. In spite of dogged attempts
to preserve the treaty, the Soviets eventually recognized the
gravity of Hitler's threats and began to seek other security
arrangements. This outcome paved the way for Litvinov's collective
security approach. During his tenure as foreign minister, the
USSR sought a partnership with the Entente powers in opposition
to a revanchist Germany. Nevertheless, in order to maximize
their tactical flexibility, the Soviets kept lines with Germany
open, never entirely abandoning the Rapallo link.
By
1938, major divisions threatened to undermine collective security.
Soviet exclusion from the Munich agreement and the West's continued
dilatoriness added weight to the perception that Soviet security
was in jeopardy. Indeed, Stalin was increasingly convinced that
continued alignment with the West would lead the USSR into war.
Concomitantly, German negotiators had begun sending signals
to the USSR regarding the possibility of rapprochement.
The
combination of these events set the stage for the Molotov-Ribbentrop
pact. Under this agreement, the USSR's aversion toward war forced
it into a dangerous posture of appeasement vis-a-vis Germany
and effectively blinded them to Hitler's real intentions. After
Operation Barbarossa, the Soviets found themselves completely
isolated and woefully unprepared to fight the German army. Thus,
in the end, the Soviet security obsession backfired. Neither
accommodation nor confrontation had successfully neutralized
Germany.
Works
Cited:
- Haslam,
Jonathan. 1984. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective
Security in Europe, 1933-39. New York: St. Martin's.
- Mastny, Vojtech. 1996. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity:
The Stalin Years. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nation, R. Craig. 1992. Black Earth, Red Star: A History of
Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
